(Re-submission) Mint 1.8 iBTC for Community Distribution — Interlay Wind-Down

Democracy
1d 9hrs ago
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This referendum repeats the proposal that was previously defeated when the Interlay Foundation cast roughly 21M from its 80M INTR against it, overriding the visible sentiment of the wider voting community seeking for extract some last value of Interlay. Given the team has now confirmed the network is being wound down with no compensation path offered to INTR holders, we are re-submitting this proposal for renewed consideration.

This referendum authorises minting 1.8 iBTC (180,000,000 raw units) into the system liquidation vault account: wd9yNSwR5jsJWJrtHcnS8Wf6D5zF2dbQhxwRuvAzg9jefbhuM
The minted iBTC will be distributed to all vINTR voters on this referendum, proportional to their vote weight — both aye and nay votes count toward a claim.
Share = (vINTR cast by voter ÷ total vINTR voted) × 1.8 iBTC

Why repeat this now
The team's wind-down announcement makes clear: external assets (bridged DOT/USDC/etc.) can be withdrawn before 22 July 2026, but INTR itself is stranded permanently — not redeemable, not bridgeable, already delisted from exchanges.
The stated path forward for INTR holders after the shut-down is a community-led chain revival, requiring collator infrastructure, runbook execution, and ongoing maintenance — a substantial technical undertaking that **no part of the community **has demonstrated the resourcing or sustained interest to take on, even while the team was still actively running the chain.
In short: INTR holders are being asked to either revive a parachain themselves or accept that their holdings end up worth nothing, while no parallel compensation mechanism has been put forward by the team.
Referendum 147 sought to address exactly this gap, and was voted down by foundation-held INTR rather than by organic community sentiment. Re-submitting it puts the question back in front of voters now that the wind-down is official and the stakes are clear.

What this does and doesn't do

It does not affect the wind-down timeline or the 22 July 2026 deadline for withdrawing external assets.
It creates a one-time, transparent, proportional distribution mechanism tied to actual participation in this vote, rather than relying on the team to define a compensation plan.

Voters should weigh this independently of how they feel about the wind-down itself — voting nay still earns a proportional share, since the goal is to capture the engaged community's stake in the outcome, not to reward a particular side.

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