-- Resubmitted with correct spendFromTreasury --
Griefing collateral is a method Interlay uses to prevent spam issues against vaults. Upon a successful issuance, the griefing collateral is returned to the requester. If the request is cancelled, the canceller claims the griefing collateral. Normally, this is the vault itself, which had locked up its capacity for the duration of the request.
The griefing collateral rate was originally set at 0.05% and later decreased to 0.025%. For a $500 value iBTC issue, the requester currently only pays $0.125 in INTR griefing fees. This has led to a proliferation of bots that request issues of any free capacity, ince the cost to request an issue is so low even if they choose not to fill their own issuance request with iBTC (due to high BTC fees) and forego the supplied griefing collateral. I propose increasing the griefing collateral rate to 2.5%, a 100x increase. The same $500 iBTC issue request would now require the issuer to lock up $12 in INTR until the issue is complete. This will have two effects:
Proposal in the attached
Interlay uses a method called "griefing collateral" to prevent spam issues against vaults. If a request is successful, the requester gets their collateral back. If the request is cancelled, the canceller gets the collateral. The griefing collateral rate was originally set at 0.05% and later decreased to 0.025%. This has led to a lot of bots spamming vaults with low-value issue requests. The proposal is to increase the griefing collateral rate to 0.5%, which will make it harder for bots to spam vaults and increase demand for $INTR. The proposal includes compensation for analysis, proposal creation, testing, and feedback.