This proposal was resubmitted as Proposal 116 with a different griefing collateral value after I received community feedback on Discord.
-- Resubmitted with correct spendFromTreasury --
Griefing collateral is a method Interlay uses to prevent spam issues against vaults. Upon a successful issuance, the griefing collateral is returned to the requester. If the request is cancelled, the canceller claims the griefing collateral. Normally, this is the vault itself, which had locked up its capacity for the duration of the request.
The griefing collateral rate was originally set at 0.05% and later decreased to 0.025%. For a $500 value iBTC issue, the requester currently only pays $0.125 in INTR griefing fees. This has led to a proliferation of bots that request issues of any free capacity, ince the cost to request an issue is so low even if they choose not to fill their own issuance request with iBTC (due to high BTC fees) and forego the supplied griefing collateral. I propose increasing the griefing collateral rate to 2.5%, a 100x increase. The same $500 iBTC issue request would now require the issuer to lock up $12 in INTR until the issue is complete. This will have two effects:
1. Increase demand for $INTR as bots and issuers of iBTC will have to hold more INTR.2. Stop issuance bots from spamming vaults full of low value issue requests they do not intend to fulfill.
Proposal in the attached ~~
~~- Increase Griefing Collateral from 0.025% -> 2.5%- Compensation for analysis, proposal creation and testing. 3 hrs = $300 or 21207 INTR at $0.01404/INTR. It was tested using Chopsticks.
Does the griefing collateral need to be increased this dramatically? I get we'd want to halt spamming from issuance bots, but we don't want to bar Average Joe from attempting to issue iBTC because he needs to hold enough griefing collateral first.